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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
BECKY LYNNE DRAPER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20040879-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals the trial court's interlocutory order denying her motion to declare 
Utah's child endangerment statute unconstitutional and to quash the bindover. Under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) (West 2004)5 this Court has jurisdiction over all interlocutory 
appeals from second and third degree felonies. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: Is Utah's child endangerment statute, which proscribes exposing a child 
to, or causing a child to ingest, a controlled substance, unconstitutionally vague as applied 
to defendant's conduct—i.e., breast-feeding her four-month-old baby after smoking 
marijuana? 
Standard of Review: Constitutional challenges to statutes present questions of law, 
which are reviewed for correctness. State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, % 42,99 P.3d 820. Whether 
the district court properly interpreted a statute is also a question of law, reviewed for 
correctness. State v. MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, | 8, 84 P.3d 1171. 
Issue No, 2: Is there probable cause to believe that defendant exposed or caused her 
four-month-old baby to ingest a controlled substance, where she smoked marijuana and then 
breast-fed her baby? 
Standard of Review: Whether to bind a criminal defendant over for trial is a question 
of law, reviewed for correctness. State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, If 8, 20 P.3d 300. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5. Endangerment of child or elder adult. 
(1) For purposes of this section: 
(a) "Chemical substance" means a substance intended to be used as a 
precursor in the manufacture of a controlled substance, or any other chemical 
intended to be used in the manufacture of a controlled substance. Intent under 
this subsection may be demonstrated by the substance's use, quantity, manner 
of storage, or proximity to other precursors, or to manufacturing equipment. 
(b) "Child" means the same as that term is defined in Subsection 76-5-
109(l)(a). 
(c) "Controlled substance" means the same as that term is defined in 
Section 58-37-2. 
(d) "Drug paraphernalia" means the same as that term is defined in 
Section 5 8-3 7a-3. 
(e) "Elder adult" means the same as that term is defined in Section 76-
5-111. 
(2) Unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person who 
knowingly or intentionally causes or permits a child or elder adult to be 
exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled substance, 
chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia as defined in Subsection (1), is 
guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
(3) Unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person who 
violates Subsection (2), and a child or elder adult actually suffers bodily injury, 
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substantial bodily injury, or serious bodily injury by exposure to, ingestion of, 
inhalation of, or contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or 
drug paraphernalia, is guilty of a felony of the second degree unless the 
exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or contact result in the death of the child or 
elder adult, in which case the person is guilty of a felony of the first degree. 
(4)(a) It is an affirmative defense to a violation of this section that the 
controlled substance was provided by lawful prescription for the child or elder 
adult, and that it was administered to the child or elder adult in accordance 
with the prescription instructions provided with the controlled substance. 
(b) As used in this Subsection (4), "prescription" has the same definition as 
in Section 58-37-2. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
Defendant, Becky Lynne Draper, was charged with one count of child endangerment, 
a third degree felony, in violation ofUtah Code Ann. §76-5-112.5 (West 2004). Rl. After 
the preliminary hearing, the magistrate bound defendant over based on evidence that she 
smoked marijuana and then nursed her baby. R66-67. 
Defendant moved to quash the bindover and to declare Utah's child endangerment 
statute (Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5) unconstitutional. R29-87. After full briefing and a 
hearing, the trial court issued a memorandum decision denying defendant's motion. R132-
40, 159-69, 180. (A copy of the trial court's memorandum decision is attached in 
Addendum A). 
lrrhe record on appeal includes a transcript volume entitled "Preliminary Hearing." 
See R179. That volume, however, is not a transcript of the preliminary hearing in this 
case. Rather, it is of a preliminary hearing held in another related prosecution of 
defendant. The only transcript of the preliminary hearing in this case is an unofficial one 
prepared by the Legal Defender's Association. The unofficial transcript is contained in 
the pleadings volume. This is the transcript that the defendant relies on in her brief. For 
purposes of this interlocutory appeal only, the State does not object to using this 
unofficial transcript. 
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This Court granted defendant's petition for interlocutory review on November 4, 
2004.2 R171. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS3 
Defendant breast-feeds her infant son, who was born on September 8,2003. R47,55, 
58. Defendant has admitted to smoking marijuana twice since her baby's birth: once onNew 
Year's Day 2004, and again on January 9, just after police had finished searching her home 
for drugs. R58. 
Search warrant 
On January 9, 2004, officers executed a search warrant at defendant's home. R46. 
Present during the search were defendant, her then four-month-old baby, and a houseguest 
named Jessica Hironas. Id. Jimmy Draper, defendant's husband, was away from home at 
the time. R46, 52, 58. 
After defendant waived her Miranda rights, Officer John Wester interviewed her. 
R49. Defendant told Officer Wester that Jimmy had been selling marijuana for the past year-
and-a-half and that he made about $800 a month from his drug sales. Id. Defendant, 
however, did not tell Officer Wester about her own drug use. Id. 
2Five days later, this Court also granted interlocutory review in State v. Nieberger, 
Case No. 20040907-CA, which raises the same issues, but under different facts. Both 
cases are on the same briefing schedule. 
3The State recites the evidence at the preliminary hearing "in a light most favorable 
to the prosecution and resolve[s] all inferences in favor of the prosecution." State v. 
Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995). Defendant is presumed innocent until proved 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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During the search, officers found items used to both consume and distribute 
marijuana. R48. Those items included: scales, bongs, pipes, sandwich baggies for 
packaging, and two individually packaged bags of marijuana—one weighing 9.9 grams and 
the other 8.7 grams. R48, 51. All of these items were found in a basement room, which 
contained a loveseat, coffee table, and space heater. R48. Officers also found money in a 
dresser drawer in defendant's bedroom, which defendant explained was "probably from drug 
sales." R49. 
Unannounced visit 
About two weeks later, on January 20,2004, Karen Barnes, an investigator with the 
Division of Child and Family Services ("DCFS"), arrived at defendant's home unannounced. 
R56-57. Barnes told defendant that she was investigating child endangerment, based on 
allegations that marijuana had been found in the home. R57. At this point, defendant again 
stated that Jimmy had been selling marijuana for the past year-and-a-half to support his drug 
habit, and that he abused drugs daily. R58. Bames asked defendant if she was abusing 
drugs. R58. Defendant admitted to smoking marijuana twice since her baby's birth: once 
on New Year's Day 2004, and again on January 9, after the officers had executed the search 
warrant at her home. Id. 
During Barnes's visit, defendant began breast-feeding her baby. R58. This prompted 
Bames to talk to defendant about the danger of using drugs and how drugs can travel through 
breast milk and be ingested by the baby. Id. Defendant claimed she was unaware of the 
danger and promised to stop using drugs. R60. 
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Barnes also warned defendant that all of the drugs and paraphernalia needed to be out 
of the house, and that police would continue to "watch the home." R58. Defendant "thought 
Jimmy . . . had taken everything out of the home," but promised that "if he had not she was 
going to follow-up on that." Id. 
The magistrate bound defendant over on child endangerment because defendant, a 
breast-feeding mother, had admitted to using marijuana. R66. This, the magistrate found, 
supported a reasonable belief that defendant had "exposed" or caused her baby to "ingest" 
illegal drugs. R66-67. The magistrate, however, was unwilling to find probable cause that 
defendant had "exposed" her baby to drugs merely because officers had found marijuana and 
paraphernalia in the basement. Id. The magistrate concluded no evidence showed "that the 
child was actually exposed to [the drugs and paraphernalia in the basement] in the sense of 
being taken down there in the presence of any of the drugs or paraphernalia that were 
available there." R66. 
The district court likewise concluded that the State had presented sufficient evidence 
to support probable cause that defendant had violated the child endangerment statute by 
"knowingly or intentionally caus[ing] her child to ingest or be exposed to a controlled 
substance, chemical substance or drug paraphernalia." R168. Like the magistrate, the 
district court based its ruling only on the fact that "[defendant was using drugs prior to 
nursing her child." Id. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: Defendant argues that Utah's child endangerment statute is 
unconstitutionally vague both because it does not give fair warning of what is prohibited to 
persons of ordinary intelligence, and it creates a risk of arbitrary or discriminatory 
enforcement. Defendant does not have standing to facially challenge the child endangerment 
statute for vagueness because she has not alleged or shown that the statute implicates any 
First Amendment freedom. Defendant, therefore, is limited to challenging the statute as 
vague only as applied to her conduct. 
Defendant argues that the statutory term "exposed to" is vague because it is undefined. 
She also claims that the terms "exposed to" and "ingest" are rendered unconstitutionally 
vague because the statute does not require a showing of danger or a substantial risk of harm. 
The term "exposed to" is not vague. Its common ordinary meaning is "to lay open," "to leave 
unprotected," or "to make accessible or subject" to. Read in the context of the statute, the 
term "exposed to" is sufficiently clear to place a person of ordinary intelligence on notice that 
the statute prohibits defendant's conduct—smoking marijuana and breast-feeding a baby. 
Moreover, neither "exposed to" nor "ingest" is rendered vague by the Legislature's decision 
to not require a showing of danger or risk of harm. 
Point II: Defendant alternatively argues that the State failed to present sufficient 
evidence at the preliminary hearing to show that she intentionally or knowingly allowed her 
baby to be exposed to or to ingest marijuana. At the preliminary hearing stage, the 
prosecution was required to present sufficient evidence to support only a reasonable belief 
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that defendant knowingly or intentionally caused or permitted her baby to be exposed to or 
to ingest a controlled substance. Here, defendant admitted using marijuana on January 1, 
2004 and January 9, 2004. Two weeks later, on January 20, a DCFS caseworker saw 
defendant breast-feeding her four-month-old baby. The magistrate and district court drew 
the reasonable inference that if defendant was breast-feeding her baby on January 20, she 
also breast-fed her baby two and three weeks earlier when she smoked marijuana. The 
magistrate and district court also reasonably inferred that defendant was aware that what she 
ingested would be passed on to the baby, despite her self-serving claim that she did not 
know. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TERM "EXPOSED TO" IN UTAH'S CHILD ENDANGERMENT 
STATUTE IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AS APPLIED 
TO DEFENDANT BECAUSE HER CONDUCT FELL WELL WITHIN 
THE ORDINARY AND COMMONLY-UNDERSTOOD MEANING OF 
THAT TERM 
Defendant was charged under subsection (2) of Utah's child or elder adult 
endangerment statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(2) (West 2004). That subsection 
makes it a third degree felony for any person to "knowingly or intentionally cause[] or 
permit[] a child or elder adult to be exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with 
a controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia as defined in Subsection 
(1)." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(2). 
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Defendant argues that the child endangerment statute is "unconstitutionally vague 
since it fails to give notice that having marijuana and paraphernalia out of reach in a house 
where an infant resides or that nursing a child at some point after using marijuana is 
prohibited conduct." Br. Aplt. 9. Specifically, defendant contends that the term "exposed 
to" is ambiguous and undefined in the statute. Br. Aplt. 21. Defendant asserts that the 
statute does not give fair warning of what is prohibited because it does not "specify the 
limitations of the term 'exposed to5" and it does not "require danger or a substantial risk of 
harm" for either "exposing" or "ingesting." Br. Aplt. 21, 25. She further asserts that the 
resulting vagueness in the statute creates a risk of arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. 
Br. Aplt. 9-15,21,26-31. 
To the extent that defendant mounts a facial challenge to the child endangerment 
statute, she does not have standing to do so. This is because she has not alleged, much less 
shown, that the statute implicates any First Amendment freedom. Defendant is therefore 
limited to challenging the statute as vague as applied only to her conduct. Moreover, because 
the magistrate bound defendant over only on the theory that she breast-fed her baby after 
smoking marijuana, that is the only conduct at issue here. The State, therefore, will not be 
responding to defendant's claim that the child endangerment statute is unconstitutionally 
vague as applied to her conduct in keeping marijuana and paraphernalia in the basement. As 
explained below, defendant has not shown that the statute is vague as applied to her because, 
read in context, the terms "exposed to" and "ingest" are sufficiently clear to place a person 
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of ordinary intelligence on notice that the statute prohibits smoking marijuana and then 
breast-feeding a baby. 
A. Defendant may not complain of the vagueness of a law as applied to the 
hypothetical conduct of others. 
Under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, a criminal statute must define the offense 
"'with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited 
and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.'" State 
v. Green, 2004 UT 76, \ 43, 99 P.3d 820 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 
(1983)). A statute need not define an offense with "mathematical certainty," however. 
Graynedv. City ofRockford, 408 U.S. 104,110 (1972). Statutes may use terms "marked by 
'flexibility and reasonable breadth, rather than meticulous specificity,'" as long as " it is clear 
what the ordinance as a whole prohibits." Id. (quoting Esteban v. Central Missouri State 
College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1088 (8th Cir. 1969)). 
Vagueness challenges "'which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be 
examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand.'" Green, 2004 UT 76, \ 44 (quoting 
Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495 n.7 
(1982)). Absent a First Amendment violation, "a court will uphold a facial vagueness 
challenge 'only if the [statute] is impermissibly vague in all of its applications.'" State v. 
MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, f 12, 84 P.3d 1171 (emphasis added). "A statute that is clear as 
applied to a particular complainant cannot be considered impermissibly vague in all of its 
applications and thus will necessarily survive a facial vagueness challenge." Id. Thus, "a 
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court should 'examine the complainant's conduct before analyzing other hypothetical 
applications of the law' when a challenged statute 'implicates no constitutionally protected 
conduct.'" Green, 2004 UT 76, Tf 44 (quoting Hoffman, 455 U.S. at 494-95). 
Here, defendant's conduct—smoking marijuana and then breast-feeding her 
baby—does not involve a constitutionally protect right. Therefore, "[defendant must show 
that [the statute] 'is impermissibly vague in all of its applications,'"starting with the instant 
case. State v. Norris, 2004 UT App 267, f 12, 97 P.3d 732 (quoting Hoffman, 455 U.S. at 
494-95), cert granted, 106 P.3d 743. 
To prevail on her vague-as-applied challenge, defendant must show "either (1) that 
the statute[] do[es] not provide 'the kind of notice that enables ordinary people to understand 
what conduct [is prohibited],' or (2) that the statute[] 'encourage[s] arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement.'" MacGuire, 2004 UT 4, f 13 (citations omitted). As explained 
below, defendant has shown neither. 
B. As used in the child endangerment statute, the term "expose to" is sufficiently 
definite to put defendant on notice that her conduct was prohibited. 
As stated, the statute here prohibits a person from intentionally or knowingly causing 
or permitting a child "to be exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a 
controlled substance . . . or drug paraphernalia." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(2). 
Defendant first attacks the term "exposed to." She contends that because "exposed to" is not 
defined in the statute, and because the term "encompass [es] a broad spectrum of actions," the 
term is ambiguous and did not give notice that her conduct was unlawful. Br. Aplt. 21, 25. 
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A statute, however, is not ambiguous or unconstitutionally vague merely because it 
does not define a statutory term. See State v. Candelario, 909 P.2d 277, 278 (Utah App. 
1995) (observing that although "representation" was subject to multiple meanings, in the 
context of the statute in which it was used, it was not ambiguous); State v. Owens, 638 P.2d 
1182, 1184 (Utah 1981) (upholding statute where "gross deviation" not defined); State v. 
Krueger, 1999 UT App 54, \ 14, 975 P.2d 489 (upholding statute where "delinquent" not 
defined); Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259,1265 (Utah App. 1997) (holding statute not 
unconstitutionally vague for failing to define "emotional distress"). Nor is a statute 
unconstitutionally vague merely because it is broad. See State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 
966 (Utah 1989) ("a statute is not unconstitutionally vague because it is broad"). Rather, the 
"essential test is whether the statute imparts fair notice of what conduct is prohibited." Id. 
A statute places a person on notice if it is "sufficiently clear to convey 'warning as to the 
proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.'" State v. 
Morrison, 2001 UT 73, % 14, 31 P.3d 547 (quoting State v. Jordan, 665 P.2d 1280, 1285 
(Utah 1983) (additional citations and quotation marks omitted)). 
1. In the context of the child endangerment statute, "expose to" means "to 
lay open," "leave unprotected," or "to make accessible or subject to." 
Although not defined in the statute, "expose to" does have "a common understanding 
that is sufficient to put people on warning as to what conduct is prohibited by the statute." 
Morrison, 2001 UT 73, ^ f 15. The dictionary defines "expose" as 
la: to lay open (as to attack, danger, trial or test): make accessible to 
something that may prove detrimental: deprive of shelter, protection, or care; 
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b: to submit or subject to an action or influence <e.g., children to good books>; 
specif: to subject (a sensitive photographic film, plate, or paper) to the action 
of radiant energy; c: to abandon (an infant) esp. by leaving in the open:.. . 2: 
to lay open to view: lay bare: make known: set forth: exhibit, display; b: to 
exhibit for public veneration. 
Webster Js Third New International Dictionary 802 (1993). See also Webster }s New World 
Dictionary 501 (4th ed. 2003), as quoted by defendant, Br. Aplt. 22.4 
The district court relied on the dictionary definition to conclude that "exposed" was 
unambiguous. R165. The court then applied "the common sense, ordinary and accepted 
meaning of the term 'exposed,'" to the facts of this case. Id. The district court noted that 
defendant "was nursing her child and was an admitted drug user." Id. The district court 
concluded that this gave rise to a reasonable inference that "defendant was using drugs prior 
to nursing her child." Id. Based on these facts and inferences, the district court further 
concluded that there was probable cause to believe that defendant "knowingly or 
intentionally caused her child to ingest or be exposed to a controlled substance, chemical 
substance, or drug paraphernalia."5 R168. In other words, the district court found probable 
4The trial court resorted to a different dictionary for its definition of "expose," but 
with the same results: 
l.a. To remove shelter or protection from; b. To lay open, as to something 
undesirable or injurious. 2. To subject (e.g., a photographic film to the 
action of light. 3. To make visible . . . 4.a. To make known (e.g., a crime); 
b. To reveal the guilt or wrongdoing of. 5. To abandon or put out without 
shelter or food. 
R165 (quoting Random House Webster's Dictionary 250 (4th ed. 2001). 
5Unlike the magistrate, the district court also found that the baby was "exposed to" 
the packaged marijuana, bongs, and pipes in the basement because they "lay open or were 
visible and the child was not protected from them." R165. As stated, however, the 
magistrate did not bind over on this theory and the State has not appealed nor otherwise 
13 
cause to believe that defendant committed child endangerment because she "subjected" or 
"exposed" her baby to illegal drugs through her breast milk. 
Defendant essentially agrees that the definition of "expose" adopted by the trial court 
is the one most applicable to the child endangerment statute: 
The statute requires that an adult allow a child "to be exposed to" a substance 
or paraphernalia; in other words the language of the statute requires exposure 
of the child to the substance or paraphernalia and not that the substance or 
paraphernalia be exposed to the child. That wording suggests that the first 
definition of "expose" found in Webster's Dictionary, "to lay open (to danger, 
attack, ridicule, etc.); leave unprotected or to make accessible or subject (to an 
influence or action): is the definition applicable to the child endangerment 
statute. 
Br. Aplt. 22-23 (emphasis added). Thus, like the trial court, defendant reasons that "a child 
who is laid open to or subjected to danger from a controlled substance or paraphernalia has 
been 'exposed to' an item within the meaning of the statute." Br. Aplt. 23. As explained, 
the baby here was "exposed to" or "subjected to" marijuana through his mother's breast milk. 
2. The term "expose to" is not rendered vague or ambiguous merely because 
it has multiple meanings. 
Defendant nevertheless asserts that because "expose" has "many different meanings 
and applications" it "does not have a commonly understood and accepted meaning." Br. 
Aplt. 22. This, defendant claims, further renders that term ambiguous. Id. 
The fact that "expose" has more than one definition does not render that term either 
ambiguous or vague. This is because statutory terms are not "construed in a vacuum." State 
challenged that ruling. This part of the district court's ruling, therefore, is not at issue 
here. 
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v. Norris, 2004 UT App 267, ^ 13, 97 P.3d 732. See also Dowling v. Bullen, 2004 UT 50, 
| 8, 94 P.3d 915 ("[s]ubsections of a statute should not be construed in a vacuum but must 
be read as part of the statute as a whole"). Rather, statutory terms must be construed 
according to their context and "as [they] relate[] to the other terms within the . . . statute." 
Norris, 2004 UT App 267, f 13. See also State v. Paul, 860 P.2d 992,994 (Utah App. 1993) 
("[Cjourts typically construe statutes on the assumption that 'each term is used advisedly and 
that the intent of the Legislature is revealed in the use of the term in the context and structure 
in which it is placed"') (quoting Ward v. Richfield City, 716 P.2d 265, 266 (Utah 1984) 
(emphasis in original); State v. Candelario, 909 P.2d 277, 278 (Utah App. 1995) (holding 
that even though term "representation" outside the context of the statute is "subject to 
multiple meanings," the term is not ambiguous "within the context of the statute"). 
As defendant herself acknowledges, when "expose to" is placed in the context of the 
child endangerment statute, it is apparent that the first definition of "expose" applies: "to lay 
open (to danger, attack, ridicule, etc.); leave unprotected or to make accessible or subject (to 
an influence or action)." Br. Aplt. 23. As stated, this is the definition that the trial court 
adopted and applied to this case. R65. The baby was "subjected to" the influence of a 
controlled substance when his mother smoked marijuana and then breast-fed him. This falls 
within the meaning of "expose to" as even defendant understands that term. See Br. Aplt. 
22-23. 
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3. The Legislature has legitimately determined that "exposing" children to 
illegal drugs and paraphernalia creates a significant risk of harm. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, defendant argues that the child endangerment statute 
is rendered vague because "the statute does not contain any language that limits the 
application of the statute to the circumstances where the 'exposure' or 'ingestion' creates 
actual danger or at least a significant risk of harm to the child." Br. Aplt. 25. Defendant 
claims that this omission renders the statute vague because it does not give her "fair notice" 
that "nursing her infant" after smoking marijuana "would subject her to prosecution for 
endangering [her] child." Br. Aplt. 25. 
It is true that the plain language of the statute unambiguously prohibits permitting 
children to be exposed to or to ingest illegal drugs, irrespective of whether any actual or 
potential risk of harm exists. This is because the Legislature has already determined that a 
substantial risk of harm is inherent in the exposure or ingestion itself. As explained below, 
this express legislative choice does not render "expose to" or "ingest" either vague or 
ambiguous. To the contrary, it places all persons of ordinary intelligence on notice that 
exposing children to drugs or paraphernalia, without more, violates the statute. 
The Legislature intentionally omitted any requirement that exposure to contraband 
create a substantial risk of harm. The structure of the statute confirms that the Legislature 
intended to prohibit exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or contact, without more. Subsection 
(2) simply provides that an adult is guilty of a third degree felony if she "knowingly or 
intentionally" causes or permits a child or elder adult to be exposed to, to ingest or inhale, 
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or to have contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia as 
defined in Subsection (1)." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(2). As defendant correctly notes, 
nothing in this subsection requires that any exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or contact 
actually create a substantial risk of harm or cause harm. Br. Aplt. 25. 
But while subsection (2) requires no showing of a risk or actual harm, subsection (3) 
does. Subsection (3) enhances the penalty to a second degree felony if a child "suffers bodily 
injury, substantial bodily injury, or serious bodily injury by exposure to, ingestion or, 
inhalation of, or contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug 
paraphernalia." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(3). That subsection further enhances the 
penalty to a first degree felony if the exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or contact results in 
death. Id. In the face of subsection (2)'s omission, subsection (3)'s enhancements serve as 
compelling evidence that the Legislature did not intend to require that mere exposure "create 
a substantial risk of harm." 
That intent is supported by the statute's legislative history. Before 2002, the child 
endangerment statute expressly prohibited placing a child "at risk of suffering bodily injury, 
substantial bodily injury, or serious bodily injury from exposure to, ingestion of, inhalation 
o f contraband. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(2) (2000) (emphasis added). See also 2002 
Laws of Utah, ch. 32. In 2002, the Legislature struck the language requiring a showing that 
the child was "at risk of suffering bodily injury." Id. It replaced that language with the 
current subsection (2), which requires only a showing of exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or 
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contact, and with the current subsection (3), which enhances the penalty if actual harm 
results. 
Defendant relies on the floor debates on the 2002 amendment to argue that deleting 
the "at risk" language "demonstrates that the Legislature did not intend for the statute to be 
broadly applied to circumstances such as these where parents have marijuana and 
paraphernalia out of reach in their home where an infant resides, or when a mother breast 
feeds her baby at some point after using marijuana." Br. Aplt. 18. Ordinarily, a court should 
not resort to legislative history when, as here, the statute is unambiguous. See Lovendahl v. 
Jordan School Dist, 2002 UT 130, % 58,63 P.3d 705 (Durrant, J., concurring and dissenting 
with two justices concurring); see also Okeefe v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 956 P.2d 279, 
281 (Utah 1998) (the term "overtime" is clear and unambiguous and the court has "no need 
to resort to other methods of construction"); Visitor Info. Cntr. Auth. v. Customer Service 
Div., 930 P.2d 1196, 1198 (Utah 1997) ("Unless the statute on its face is unclear or 
ambiguous, we find no need to delve into the uncertain facts of legislative history"); Salt 
Lake Child &Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1995) 
("When language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it expresses, and 
no room is left for construction"). But in this case, contrary to defendant's assertions, the 
floor debates demonstrate that the Legislature did indeed intend to broaden the reach of the 
child endangerment statute. 
In introducing the 2002 amendment to the House, Representative Beck explained that 
instead of requiring a showing of "risk" to children or elder adults, the original statute 
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"should have simply made it illegal to expose them to a non-prescribed controlled 
substance." R80. Representative Beck elaborated: "Obviously they have already determined 
that the controlled substances are risky to an individual's health, otherwise they would not 
be a controlled substance. The same is true with the drug paraphernalia and chemicals used 
to making illegal drugs" Id, Representative Beck further explained that the "current 
language unintentionally requires the prosecutor to present scientific evidence to show that 
the controlled substances are dangerous." Id, That, the representative continued, is "not only 
expensive but it's also ridiculous to spend all their time trying to show that." Id, 
Senator Julander expressed similar concerns about the "at risk" language when 
presenting the amendment to the Senate. "Obviously," she explained, "we've already 
determined that controlled substances are risky to an individual's health." Recording of the 
Proceedings of the 54th Legislature, Senate Floor Debates of H.B. 125, Day 40, March 1, 
2002, Tape 46 (transcribed by Adrienne Nakamura, secretary, Utah Attorney General's 
Office) (attached at Addendum B).6 Thus, she stated, the "current language unintentionally 
requires a prosecutor to present specific evidence to show that controlled substances are 
dangerous." Id. (Emphasis added). Senator Valentine initially objected to the amendment 
because he believed that dropping the "at risk" language would criminalize the innocent 
possession of two or more precursors in a house where children were present. Id. Senator 
6Defendant attached transcripts of the House floor debates on the amendment to 
her memoranda below and to her opening brief. She has not, however, provided a 
transcript of the Senate floor debate on the 2002 amendment. For the Court's 
convenience, the State has supplied a copy of that debate at Addendum B. 
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Valentine's concern was resolved, however, not by leaving the "at risk" language in, but by 
requiring that possession of any precursors be with the intent to manufacture illegal drugs. 
Recording of the Proceedings of the 54th Legislature, Senate Floor Debates of H.B. 125, Day 
43, March 4, 2002, Tape 49 (transcribed by Adrienne Nakamura, secretary, Utah Attorney 
General's Office) (attached at Addendum B). See also 2002 Law of Utah, ch. 32. 
In sum, the child endangerment statute unambiguously requires a showing that an 
adult permitted a child to be exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with illegal 
drugs or paraphernalia. Nothing in the plain language requires that the State also prove that 
such exposure, ingestion, inhalation, or contact creates a significant risk or harm. Indeed, 
as shown by the 2002 amendment and the supporting floor debates, the Legislature 
consciously chose to drop that requirement. Thus, notwithstanding defendant's claims, the 
Legislature did intend that "expose to" and "ingest" would reach a broader spectrum of 
conduct than it previously had. 
Eliminating the "at risk" language did not render "expose to" or "ingest" 
unconstitutionally vague. As stated, defendant argues that "expose to" and "ingest" is 
unconstitutionally vague unless the statute also requires a substantial risk of harm. Br. Aplt. 
14-15,21,25-28. To support this claim, defendant relies on two out-of-state decisions, State 
v. Downey, 476 N.E.2d 121 (Ind. 1985) and Commonwealth v. Carter, 462 S.E.2d 582 (Va. 
Ct. App. 1995). Id. Neither case is helpful, however, because both construed statutes 
completely different from the one at issue here. 
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The statute in Downey prohibited a "person having the care, custody or control of a 
dependent" from "knowingly or intentionally [placing] the dependent in a situation that may 
endanger his life or health." Downey, 476 N.E.2d at 122. The Downey court held that the 
statute, construed literally, criminalized exposing a dependent "to the risk of a risk of harm." 
Id. at 123. Thus, "it would be a crime to raise a child in a high-rise apartment or to mop the 
kitchen floor with a bucket of water in the presence of a small child." Id. This literal 
construction, the Downey court said, had "a broadness and vagueness which would prevent 
it from meeting constitutional muster." Id. To avoid this constitutional infirmity, Downey 
read the statute to require that the "placement must itself expose the dependent in a danger 
which is actual and appreciable." Id. 
Carter interpreted a similar statute. That statute prohibited a child's custodian from 
"willfully or negligently" permitting the child "to be placed in a situation that its life, health 
or morals may be endangered " Carter, 462 S.E.2d at 584 (emphasis added). The Carter 
court concluded that "[b]y using the term 'may,' the legislature criminalize[d] any act which 
presented] a 'possibility' of physical or moral harm to the child." Id. at 585. Accordingly, 
Carter found this provision of the statute unconstitutionally vague. Id. (Citation omitted). 
The statutes in Downey and Carter were not, as defendant suggests, unconstitutionally 
vague because they did not require a significant risk of harm. Br. Aplt. 25-28. They were 
unconstitutionally vague because a person of ordinary intelligence would be unable to tell 
what risk of harm she must avoid. 
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In contrast, Utah's child endangerment statute specifies the harm it seeks to prevent: 
permitting children to be exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with illegal drugs 
or paraphernalia. No one is left to guess what risk of harm must be avoided. Rather, the 
statute spells it out: adults must not intentionally or knowingly expose their children to illegal 
drugs or paraphernalia, or permit them to ingest controlled substances. 
Ultimately, defendant's claim that the statute is vague unless it requires a showing of 
a substantial risk of harm is based on two faulty assumptions. First, defendant assumes that 
because the term "expose" covers a broad spectrum of conduct, it is necessarily vague. But, 
as explained above, a statute is not vague just because it covers a broad spectrum of conduct. 
See State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989). For example, the Legislature could, 
if it chose, simply penalize possessing illegal drugs and paraphernalia in the same home 
where children are present, whether or not the children were "exposed to" or were even 
aware that drugs were present. The fact that such a statute would catch in its net a broad 
spectrum of behavior would not render the statute unconstitutionally vague, because it would 
impart "fair notice" that possession of contraband in a home where children were present 
was strictly prohibited. See id. Indeed, our legislature has already seen fit to enhance drug 
offenses whenever they occur within a 1000 feet of places where children are likely to be 
found—schools, parks, churches, and day care centers. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(4) 
(West 2004). This enhancement applies whether or not children are actually present at the 
time of the offense, whether they are actually aware of the drugs, or, indeed, whether the 
drugs, in fact, present a substantial risk of harm. 
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Defendant's second faulty assumption is that mere exposure to illegal drugs or 
paraphernalia or ingesting drugs through breast milk do not create a risk of harm. But, as 
stated, the Legislature has already determined—as evidenced by the statute's plain language 
and legislative history—that exposure alone does create a serious risk of harm for children. 
This legislative determination is not without support. According to a recent study by the 
National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University, "[c]hildren of 
illicit drug abusers are likelier than children of non-drug abusers to demonstrate immature, 
impulsive or irresponsible behavior, to have lower IQ scores, more absences from school and 
to have behavioral problems, depression and anxiety—all signs of risk for substance abuse." 
CASA White Paper, Family Matters: Substance Abuse and The American Family, The 
National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University 12 (March 
2005), available at http://www.casacolumbia.org. "Children of drug abusing parents, 
particularly drug-abusing mothers, are [also] more likely to be disobedient, aggressive, 
withdrawn and detached. These children also tend to have fewer friends, lower confidence 
in their ability to make friends and a greater likelihood of being avoided by their peers." Id. 
According to this study, these children are also at a heightened risk of being abused or 
neglected. Id. at 20. 
In any event, the exposure here is much more direct than allowing children to see or 
live among illegal drugs and paraphernalia. Here, the exposure came from defendant 
subjecting her baby to illegal drugs through her breast milk. A reasonably intelligent person 
would be on notice that the statute prohibits this. 
23 
In short, exposing a child to illegal drugs and paraphernalia, either through breast-milk 
or simply making the contraband accessible to the child, creates an inherent risk of harm. 
The term "expose to," therefore, is not unconstitutionally vague merely because the statute 
does not require a showing of a substantial risk of harm. Rather, the question is whether the 
statute would place a person of ordinary intelligence on notice that defendant's 
conduct—smoking marijuana and breast-feeding her baby—is prohibited.7 
4. Defendant's conduct falls well within the common ordinary meaning of 
"exposed to." 
As both the magistrate and the district court recognized, defendant's conduct falls 
"unmistakably within the statute's purview." Green, 2004 UT 76, f 52. Indeed, defendant's 
conduct of smoking marijuana and breast-feeding her baby is precisely what the child 
endangerment statute seeks to prevent. As stated, "expose" means "to lay open," "leave 
unprotected," "to make accessible," or to "subject" one to something, such as an influence 
defendant's brief posits several hypotheticals in support of her claim that 
"expose" can be read so broadly as to allow prosecution for a host of innocent behavior, 
such as allowing "a child to be in the room when a television depicts an actor using drugs, 
allowing a child to walk by a shop where a pipe is displayed in a window, or taking a 
child to a park where people are smoking marijuana." Br. Aplt. 24. As explained above, 
defendant may not complain of the vagueness of a statute as applied to the hypothetical 
conduct of others. See Green, 2004 UT 76, ^ | 44. Defendant has not been prosecuted for 
the conduct she cites; she has been prosecuted for smoking marijuana and then breast-
feeding her baby. Moreover, defendant's examples are not covered by the statute. The 
child endangerment statute requires that a person "knowingly or intentionally cause[] or 
permit[] a child . . to be exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a 
controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia as defined in Subsection 
(1)." The definition of "drug paraphernalia" only encompasses those items that are 
"intended for" use in manufacturing or introducing a controlled substance in to the body. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(l)(d) & § 58-37a-3. Thus, the statute's clear scienter 
requirements "mitigates any existing vagueness." Green, 20024 UT 76, f 49. 
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or action. Br. Aplt. 22 (quoting Webster's New World Dictionary, 4th ed. 501 (4th ed. 2003). 
Under that common, dictionary definition, a person of ordinary intelligence would 
understand that the statute prohibits defendant's conduct of smoking marijuana and breast-
feeding her baby. 
C. "Expose to" is not so indefinite that it encourages arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement. 
Defendant argues that "expose to" is so vague that it encourages arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement Br. Aplt. 15-20,28-31. Again, in an as-applied challenge, this 
Court "must focus on the particular conduct at hand and not on the possible conduct of 
hypothetical parties." Green, 004 UT 76, ^ 51. Thus, the question is whether "law 
enforcement officials encountering [defendant's] circumstances would... be left to pursue 
their own personal predilections in determining the applicability of Utah's [child 
endangerment] statute." Id. at ^52. They would not. 
Here, the evidence was uncontroverted that defendant smoked marijuana and nursed 
her baby. This conduct falls squarely within the plain meaning of the statutory terms "expose 
to" or cause "to ingest." Under these circumstances, law enforcement officers would not be 
left to decide, in their discretion, "that the statute's provisions should not apply." Id. Indeed, 
abusing illegal drugs while nursing a baby is precisely the kind of conduct that the child 
endangerment seeks to prevent. Defendant's vagueness challenge accordingly fails. 
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POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE AT PRELIMINARY HEARING WAS SUFFICIENT 
TO ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT 
DEFENDANT COMMITTED CHILD ENDANGERMENT WHERE 
SHE INTENTIONALLY OR KNOWINGLY LEFT MARIJUANA AND 
PARAPHERNALIA IN AREAS OF HER HOME THAT WERE 
ACCESSIBLE TO, AND IN PLAIN VIEW OF, HER CHILDREN 
Defendant argues that even if "exposed to" is construed broadly, the State "did not 
establish probable cause to believe that [she] intentionally or knowingly allowed her infant 
'to be exposed to' or ingest marijuana." Br. Aplt. 37. As shown below, however, the 
evidence at preliminary hearing was more than sufficient to give rise to a reasonable belief 
that defendant permitted her baby to be exposed to or to ingest marijuana. 
Bindover standard. "To bind a defendant over for trial, the State must show 
'probable cause' at a preliminary hearing by 'presenting] sufficient evidence to establish that 
the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed it.'" State v. 
Clark, 2001 UT 9, ^ 10, 20 P.3d 300 (quoting State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 
1995) (additional internal quotation marks and citations omitted). See also State v. Talbot, 
972 P.2d 435, 437 (Utah 1998). Thus, "to prevail at a preliminary hearing, the prosecution 
must. . . produce believable evidence of all the elements of the crime charged." Clark, 2001 
UT 9, Tf 15 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
The quantum of evidence necessary to support a finding of probable cause for a 
bindover is low—the same as that for obtaining an arrest warrant. Id. at f^ 16. Under both 
standards, the prosecution must only present "sufficient evidence to support a reasonable 
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belief that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it." Id. 
(Emphasis added). 
In determining whether the evidence supports a reasonable belief that defendant 
committed each element of the charged offense, "[t]he magistrate must view all the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the prosecution and must draw all reasonable inferences in 
favor of the prosecution." Id. at | 10 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) 
(alteration in original). See also State v. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, % 3, 26 P.3d 223 
(magistrate must "resolve all inferences in favor of the prosecution"). 
"[W]hen faced with conflicting evidence, the magistrate may not sift or weigh the 
evidence . . . but must leave those tasks to the fact finder at trial." Clark, 2001 UT 9, ^ f 10 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, when the evidence gives rise to 
alternative reasonable inferences, the magistrate must choose those inferences that support 
the State's case. See id. at ^ 20 (although preliminary hearing evidence gave rise to two 
alternate inferences - one suggesting innocence and the other guilt - viewing the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the State, evidence supported probable cause); see also 
Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, f 20 ("Although defendants' characterizations of the facts may also 
be plausibly inferred from the evidence, there are clearly factual issues that must be resolved 
at trial, and the facts do not negate the reasonable inferences presented by the State"). 
This case. The prosecution here was required to present sufficient credible evidence 
to support a reasonable belief that defendant "knowingly or intentionally cause[d] or 
permit[ted]" her baby "to be exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a 
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controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia as defined in Subsection 
(l).9' Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-112.5(2). The prosecution did so. 
Defendant admitted using marijuana on January 1, 2004 and January 9, 2004. R58. 
Two weeks later, on January 20, a DCFS worker saw defendant breast-feeding her then four-
month-old baby. R56-5 8. The DCFS worker told defendant "about the dangers of using and 
how marijuana and any other drugs go through the breast milk to the child." R58. Defendant 
claimed she did not know that and promised that she would stop using drugs. R59-60. 
Both the magistrate and the district court drew the reasonable inference that if 
defendant was breast-feeding her baby on January 20, she also breast-fed her baby on the 
days she smoked marijuana two to three weeks earlier. R.67, 165, 168. Contrary to 
defendant's suggestion, it is not reasonable to believe that defendant abstained from breast-
feeding her baby between January 1 and 9 and again between January 9 and 20. Br. Aplt. 42-
43. 
With respect to defendant's intent, both the magistrate and the district court 
acknowledged that defendant had told the caseworker that she did not know that marijuana 
would pass through her breast milk. Both courts recognized, however, that a competing 
inference—that defendant was not being truthful—could be drawn and that defendant was 
aware that what she ingested would also be ingested by her baby through her breast milk. 
R168; R67. Both courts properly resolved the conflicting inferences in favor of the State. 
Rl 68; R66-67. See Clark, 2001 UT 9, ^ f 20 (although preliminary hearing evidence gave rise 
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to two alternate inferences - one suggesting innocence and the other guilt - viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the State, evidence supported probable cause) . 
Defendant argues that the caseworker's testimony was insufficient to establish that 
marijuana can be transmitted through breast milk because the worker was not qualified as an 
expert witness. Br. Aplt. 44-45. This Court should not address this claim because defendant 
did not object to the caseworker's testimony at preliminary hearing, nor did she object to the 
magistrate relying on that testimony to find probable cause. R5 8,60. Defendant waited until 
her motion to quash before raising this issue, but by then it was too late for the prosecution 
to cure any claimed foundational defect. Rl80:3-4. 
In any event, the record does not support defendant's claim that the caseworker was 
not qualified to testify whether marijuana can be transmitted through breast milk. Rather, 
the record is silent on that point. It is likely that the DCFS caseworker, who was charged 
with protecting children, in fact was qualified through her education and experience to testify 
regarding this matter. See Utah R. Evid. 702; Patey v. Lainhart, 1999 UT 3 1 4 17,977 P.2d 
1193 ("A person may be qualified to testify as an expert by virtue of experience and training; 
formal education is not necessarily required"). See also Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329, 
1337 (Utah 1993) ("formal training or education is not a prerequisite to giving expert 
opinion, and a witness may qualify as an expert by virtue of his experience or training") 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). No foundation for the caseworker's 
experience or knowledge was laid, however, because defendant did not object. The 
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magistrate, therefore, was completely justified in accepting the caseworker's testimony for 
purposes of determining probable cause. 
In sum, while perhaps not enough to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
preliminary hearing testimony, along with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, 
was sufficient to give rise to a reasonable belief that defendant knowingly or intentionally 
caused her child to ingest or to be exposed to a controlled substance. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully asks the Court to affirm the district 
court's denial of defendant's motion to quash the bindover. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J2J>^dav of JlunL . 2005. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
AURAB.DUPAIX 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
Trial Court's Memorandum Decision 
HIED 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT * Prt/2-'03 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH TtjjRQ DISTRICT COURT 
West Valley Department H E S^ VALLEY DEPT. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, (Motion to Quash / Declare Utah 
Code § 76-5-112.5 Unconstitutional) 
vs. d^lbc^j 
BECKY DRAPER, Case No. Jm$$Q%^ 
Defendant. Judge Terry L. Christiansen 
The above matter came before the Court for oral argument on Becky Draper's 
(Defendant) motion to quash bindover / declare Utah Code § 76-5-112.5 unconstitutional on 
September 13, 2004. Lana Taylor appeared on behalf of the State of Utah and Shannon Romero 
appeared on behalf of the Defendant. The Court took the matter under advisement. Having 
reviewed the file and having researched the law pertaining to the issue, the Court DENIES the 
Defendant's motion to quash / declare Utah Code § 76-5-112.5 unconstitutional. 
BACKGROUND 
1 On January 9, 2004, Salt Lake County Detective John Wester (Wester) executed a search 
warrant at Defendant's residence, located at 9642 South Garnet Drive, Salt Lake County. 
2 At the time Wester executed the warrant, the Defendant was present with her 4 month old 
child. 
3 During execution of the warrant, Wester discovered individually packaged marijuana and 
packing material for marijuana distribution, e.g., scales, money, a pay/owe sheet, bongs 
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and pipes. All of these items, except for the money, was found in the basement. 
4 Defendant stated that her husband, Jimmy Draper, had been selling marijuana for about 
one and a half years. 
5 The items tested positive for marijuana by the State Crime Lab. 
6 Karen Barnes (Barnes), a child protective services investigator for the Division of Child 
and Family Services, received a referral concerning allegations of child endangerment. 
7 Barnes made an unannounced visit to Defendant's residence on January 20, 2004. 
Defendant admitted to Barnes that she had smoked marijuana on New Years Eve and on 
the day Wester executed the search warrant. 
8 While Barnes was interviewing the Defendant, the Defendant began breast feeding her 
child. At that point, Barnes discussed the dangers of using marijuana and how marijuana 
and any other drugs go through the breast milk to the child. The Defendant was not 
aware that marijuana remains in a person's system or that it would go through the breast 
milk to the child The Defendant indicated that she would not use drugs anymore. 
9 Barnes did not have the Defendant or the child tested for drugs. 
10 On February 9, 2004, Defendant was charged with endangerment of child or elder adult, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code § 76-5-112 5. 
11 On May 3, 2004, the Court bound over for trial concluding that there was sufficient 
evidence to find probable cause to believe that Defendant's child was endangered and that 
Defendant committed the crime. 
12 Thereafter, the Defendant filed the present motion to quash / declare Utah Code § 76-5-
112 5 unconstitutional challenging both (1) the constitutionality of the endangerment of 
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child or elder adult statute, § 76-5-112 5 and (2) the quantum of proof produced by the 
State at the preliminary hearing that the Defendant committed the crime of endangerment 
of a child. 
I 
VAGUENESS 
In deciding the constitutionality of a statute, the court must first analyze the plain 
language of the statute. State v. Macguire, 2004 UT 4, ^15, 84 P 3d 1171, 1175. "We need not 
look beyond the plain language unless we find some ambiguity in it." Id at 1J15 (citing Utah Sch 
Bds. Ass'n v. State Bd OfEduc, 2001 UT 2, ^13, 17 P 3d 1125). 
Section 76-5-112 5(2) provides* 
Unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person who knowingly 
or intentionally causes or permits a child or elder adult to be exposed to, to ingest 
or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or 
drug paraphernalia as defined in subsection (1), is guilty of a felony of the third 
degree. 
"A constitutional challenge to a statute presents a question of law. . . . When addressing 
such a challenge, this court presumes that the statute is valid, and we resolve any reasonable 
doubts in favor of constitutionality." State v. Morrison, 2001 UT 73,1J5, 31 P 3d 547. 
"Additionally, legislative enactments are presumed to be constitutional, and those who challenge 
a statute or ordinance as unconstitutional bear the burden of demonstrating its 
unconstitutionality." State v. Green, 2004 UT 76, f42 (Internal quotation marks omitted). 
"[VJagueness questions are essentially procedural due process issues, i e , whether the 
statute adequately notices the proscribed conduct" Id at |^43 Where a statute "implicates no 
constitutionally protected conduct, a court will uphold a facial vagueness challenge only if the 
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[statute] is impermissibly vague in all of its applications." State v. Macguire, supra, 2004 UT at 
TJ12 (quoting Village of Hoffman Estate v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 
494-95 (1982). 
A statute that is clear as applied to a particular complainant cannot be considered 
impermissibly vague in all of its applications and thus will necessarily survive a 
facial vagueness challenge. . . . In order to establish that the complained of 
provisions are impermissibly vague, a defendant must demonstrate either (1) that 
the statutes do not provide the kind of notice that enables ordinary people to 
understand what conduct [is prohibited], or (2) that the statutes encourage 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 
Id. at TJ13 (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Green, supra, 
2004 UT at ft*3 . 
"If a statute is sufficiently explicit to inform the ordinary reader what conduct is 
prohibited, it is not unconstitutionally vague." Id. at {^14. "[A] defendant who engages in some 
conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the 
conduct of others." State v. Ansari, 2004 UT App. 326, \AA (Internal quotation mcirks omitted). 
"[Vjagueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms 
must be examined in light of the facts at hand.. . . Additionally, a court should examine the 
complainant's conduct before analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law when a 
challenged statute implicates no constitutionally protected conduct." State v. Green, supra, 2004 
UT at ^44 (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). 
Utah courts have upheld statutes with undefined terms that were challenged as 
unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g., State v. Owens, 638 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah \9S\)(upheld 
statute where "gross deviation" was undefined); State v. Krueger, 1999 UT App. 54, ^[14, 975 
P.2d 489, 496 (Utah App. I999)(upheld statute where "delinquent" was undefined); Salt Lake 
Cityv. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259, 1265 (Utah App. \991)(upheld statute where "emotional distress" 
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was undefined). 
In State v. Owens, supra, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the statute legitimately 
proscribed a broad spectrum of conduct and the undefined term had a common sense meaning. 
638P.2dat 1184. 
In State v. Krueger, supra, the Court of Appeals of Utah relied upon the widespread 
usage of the terms "delmquency" and "contributing to the delinquency" of a minor to give clear 
and understandable meaning to those terms of the statute. State v. Krueger, supra, 1999 UT 
App. at Tfl4. The Court of Appeals evaluated the connotation of those terms and whether such 
connotations were "sufficiently well known that persons of ordinary intelligence and judgment 
who desire to do so would have no difficulty in governing their conduct by the statute." Id. at 
1115. 
In Salt Lake City v. Lopez, supra, the Court of Appeals of Utah relied upon the statute's 
specific intent requirement and stated that "a specific intent requirement significantly vitiates any 
claim that its purported vagueness could mislead a person of common intelligence into 
misunderstanding what is prohibited." Salt Lake City v. Lopez, supra, 935 P.2d at 1265. 
Moreover, the Court of Appeals examined the complainant's conduct before analyzing other 
hypothetical applications of the law to determine whether the statute was unconstitutionally 
applied to the defendant. Id. The Court of Appeals concluded that given the defendant's 
knowledge and conduct, he could not claim that the statute was vague as applied to him, "let 
alone that the statute is totally invalid and incapable of any valid application." Id. 
When a term is undefined, the term's ordinary and accepted meaning is often taken from 
the dictionary. See, e.g., Provo City v. Cannon, 1999 UT App. 344,1J13, 994 P.2d 206 (defining 
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"peril" with Webster's Dictionary); State v. Serpente, 768 P.2d 994, 996 (Utah App. 
I989)(defining "expose" with Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary). 
A 
Section 76-5-112.5(2) is presumed to be constitutional, therefore, Defendant bears a 
heavy burden of demonstrating its unconstitutionality. The Court concludes that Defendant fails 
to carry her heavy burden. Section 76-5-112.5(2) clearly gives notice that ordinary people of 
intelligence and judgment who desire to do so would have no difficulty in governing their 
conduct by the statute. Ordinary people of intelligence and judgment reading § 76-5-112.5(2) 
would understand that if a person knowingly or intentionally causes or permits a child or elder 
adult to be exposed to, to ingest or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled substance, 
chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia they are guilty of a third degree felony. 
There is no constitutional right to causing or permitting a child to be exposed to or have 
contact with a controlled substance, a chemical substance or drug paraphernalia, therefore, 
Defendant's facial vagueness challenge will succeed only if the statute is "impermissibly vague 
in all of its applications." State v. Macguire, supra, 2004 UT at [^12. 
The Defendant contends that the term "exposed" is undefined and therefore, does not 
provide a person of reasonable intelligence with enough detail to know what type of conduct is 
prohibited. The Defendant argues that there is no way of knowing what is meant by the term 
"exposed." The Court does not agree. 
The term "exposed" needs no definition to be constitutional. By not defining the term 
"exposed" the legislature did not "impermissibly delegate basic policy matters to judges and 
juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis" as argued by the Defendant. Rather, the 
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legislature allows the fact finder to evaluate the facts of a case and apply the term "exposed" 
using the common sense or ordinary meaning of the term. "Expose" as defined by Webster's is: 
La. To remove shelter or protection from; b. To lay open, as to something 
undesirable or injurious. 2. To subject (e.g., a photographic film) to the action of 
light. 3. To make visible . . . 4.a. To make known (e.g., a crime); b. To reveal the 
guilt or wrongdoing of. 5. To abandon or put out without shelter or food. 
Random House Webster's dictionary at 250 (4th Ed. 2001); see also Webster's II: New Riverside 
University Dictionary at 452 (1988). 
The statute legitimately reaches a broad spectrum of conduct to allow the fact finder to 
determine under the specific facts of the case whether the child or elder were "exposed" to "a 
controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia." There is no ambiguity in the 
statute and since the plain meaning of the statute is clear using the ordinary and accepted 
meaning of the term "exposed," the Court need not look to the legislative intent. 
Under the facts of this case, the Defendant's residence had packaged marijuana, bongs, 
and pipes. Applying the common sense, ordinary and accepted meaning of the term "exposed," 
the marijuana, bongs and pipes lay open or were visible and the child was not protected from 
them, therefore, the child was "exposed" to the items. Moreover, the intent requirement that the 
Defendant "knowingly or intentionally" exposed the child significantly vitiates the impact of not 
defining the term "exposed" because a person of common intelligence would understand what is 
prohibited. 
Furthermore, the Defendant was nursing her child and was an admitted drug user. An 
inference that the Defendant was using drugs prior to nursing her child is reasonable. Therefore, 
the "ingested" portion of the statute might apply because the Defendant was knowingly and 
intentionally breastfeeding her child, who was ingesting the drugs through the breastmilk. 
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As applied in this case, Section 76-5-112.5(2) is constitutional, therefore, the statute 
cannot be "impermissibly vague in all of its applications" as required to succeed on a vagueness 
challenge. 
Defendant also argues that § 76-5-112.5(2) encourages arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement because there are not minimal guidelines or circumstances where "exposure" occurs 
to guide law enforcement and judges, therefore, they consciously or subconsciously discriminate 
against certain classes of individuals. 
Although the Court need not address this challenge, because the Court previously decided 
that as applied in this case § 76-5-112.5(2) is constitutional, the Court clarifies that § 76-5-
112.5(2) legitimately proscribes a broad spectrum of conduct. To attempt to define guidelines or 
circumstances would be arbitrary. See, e.g., State v. Owens, supra, 638 P.2d at 1184-85. As 
written, § 76-5-112.5(2) avoids arbitrarily narrowing the proscribed conduct and allows the fact 
finder to determine whether under the circumstances the child or elder person was "exposed" to 
"a controlled substance, chemical substance, or drug paraphernalia" applying the common sense, 
ordinary and accepted meaning of the term "exposed." 
B 
Defendant also argues that § 76-5-112 5(2) is unconstitutionally vague because the statute 
appears to criminalize potential harm rather than actual harm. Specifically, Defendant argues 
that the mere possibility or risk of "exposure" is sufficient to support the charge, which is 
unconstitutional and cites several non-binding cases. The Court is not persuaded. 
Based upon the common sense or ordinary meaning of the term "exposed" as stated 
above, a person may decide under the circumstances whether the child or elder adult was 
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"exposed" to the prohibited items. The Court is not inclined to believe that the only harm is 
actual inhalation, ingesting or contact with because the Legislature did include the term 
"exposed," which under the general ordinary meaning of the word includes "to lay open," or 
"make visible," or "to remove shelter or protection from." These definitions are less than actual 
inhalation, ingestion or contact with, but are within the ordinary meaning of "exposed." 
Furthermore, just because a child or elder adult does not inhale, ingest or have contact with the 
prohibited items does not mean that they are not harmed. 
n 
PROBABLE CAUSE 
Alternatively, the Defendant argues that the State failed to demonstrate probable cause to 
believe the Defendant committed the offense of child endangerment. The Court does not agree. 
The "quantum of evidence necessary to support a bindover" is the same as that required 
for issuance of an arrest warrant: "[T]he prosecution must present sufficient evidence to support a 
reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it." State 
v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, ^ 16. The Court outlined the magistrate's role, summarizing the 
conclusions of a number of prior cases: 
To bind a defendant over for trial, the State must show probable cause at a 
preliminary hearing by presenting sufficient evidence to establish that the crime 
charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed it. At this 
stage of the proceeding, the evidence required [to show probable cause] . . . is 
relatively low because the prosecution's case will only get stronger as the 
investigation continues. Accordingly, when faced with conflicting evidence, the 
magistrate may not sift or weigh the evidence . . . but must leave those tasks to the 
fact finder at trial. Instead, the magistrate must view all evidence in a light most 
favorable to the prosecution and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of 
the prosecution. Yet, the magistrate's role in this process, while limited, is not 
that of a rubber stamp for the prosecution . . . . Even with this limited role, the 
magistrate must attempt to ensure that all groundless and improvident 
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prosecutions are ferreted out no later than the preliminary. 
Id at % 10 (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted; interpolation by the Court; 
emphasis added). The Clark court held "that to prevail at a preliminary hearing, the prosecution 
must still produce believable evidence of all the elements of the crime charged." Id (Internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Schroyer, 44 P.3d 730, 732 (Utah 2002); State v. 
Robinson, 63 P.3d 105, 106 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). 
Section 76-5-112.5(2) provides: 
Unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person who knowingly 
or intentionally causes or permits a child or elder adult to be exposed to, to ingest 
or inhale, or to have contact with a controlled substance, chemical substance, or 
drug paraphernalia as defined in subsection (1), is guilty of a felony of the third 
degree. 
Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the State and drawing all reasonable 
inferences in the State's favor, the Court concludes that the State met its burden to bindover to 
show a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it. 
As stated above, supra LA., the Defendant was nursing her child and was an admitted drug user. 
A reasonable inference that the Defendant was using drugs prior to nursing her child can be 
made, therefore, the "ingested" portion of the statute may apply. Although there was testimony 
that the Defendant did not know that the drugs in her system and would pass to her child when 
she was nursing, the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the State and all 
reasonable inferences drawn in the State's favor. The Court concludes that there was enough 
evidence at the preliminary hearing to show that Defendant knowingly or intentionally caused 
her child to ingest or be exposed to a controlled substance, chemical substance or drug 
paraphernalia. 
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The Court DENIES Defendant's motion to quash bindover / declare Utah Code § 76-5-
112 5 unconstitutional. 
Dated thiM&tiy <jtfS§$fitet>er, 2004 
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Senate Floor Debates on 2002 Amendment 
to Child Endangerment Statute 
Senate Debate on HB 125 March 1, 2002 
54th Leg. General Session, Day 40 Tape 46 
Mr. President: Let's next go to house bill 125 
: House bill 125 endangerment of child or elder person with controlled substance or 
precursor, by representative (inaudible) Senator Joe Lander. 
Mr. President: Senator Julander. 
Senator Julander: There were two over sights dealing in the section dealing with a child 
or elder adult in 76-5-112.5. We will correct those two problems with this bill. The first 
problem is that the section contains an awkward (inaudible) requirement. Obviously 
we've already determined that controlled substances are risky to an individual's health. 
The current language unintentionally requires a prosecutor to present specific evidence to 
show that controlled substances are dangerous. This is not only expensive it's rather 
ridiculous. The other oversight in this section is that it contains no exceptions for drugs, 
which are administered in accordance with a prescription from a physician; this bill also 
fixes that problem. This bill was requested by the State Wide Association of Prosecutors 
and supported by the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice and (inaudible) 
Commission, the Law Enforcement Legislative Committee, and the Utah Substance 
Abuse Anti-Violence Counsel. It passed unanimously in all committees and on the house 
floor. 
Mr. President: Senator Valentine? 
Senator Valentine: Thank you Mr. President. This bill (inaudible). 
Senator Julander: I can't hear him. 
Mr. President: Try him again; let's see if it'll turn on (inaudible) again. Oh that's better. 
Senator Valentine: I don't think, that it was an oversight. Specifically lines 27, 28, and 
29,1 remember the debate on this, and I remember that this was one of the elements of a 
different crime. So that we have a different crime, of being exposed in addition to the 
possession or the obvious crime of having the drug paraphernalia, the drugs themselves, 
um, of having um, a meth. Lab, but the additional crime in addition to the, the underlying 
crime was this exposure, and so by deleting out 27, 28, and 29 you now make it an 
automatic crime. So that if the drug paraphernalia is in the same house someplace as the 
child, but all of the sudden now you have two crimes that have been committed. And we 
talked about that very thing, and we argued back and forth about that and we finally 
decided that we wanted to have that felony crime, that enhanced crime there when you 
had to prove one additional element, and the element was, the very things you're 
dropping out. Can you tell me now why we will have two crimes for one action, by 
dropping that out? Why that's good policy? 
1 
Senator Julander: (There's still two crimes) I, if I understand your question, there's still 
two crimes, but you don't. But, but if you look at line 17, it already defines the chemical 
substance. 
Senator Valentine: Yea, that's the chemical substance, but if it's someplace in the 
dwelling, maybe even totally removed from where the children can get to, you're saying 
now it's a second crime because you've dropped out, you make it an automatic second 
crime. You dropped out the exposure provision, which was the provision that we 
negotiated to put in as the second element of the crime. 
Senator Julander: But if you, uh if they have to be exposed to it if you look in 33-32 they 
have to exposed to it or ingest it. 
Senator Valentine: But aren't you dropping out in the previous lines the exposure? Cause 
you're saying unless a greater penalty is otherwise provided by law, any person who 
knowingly or intentionally cause or permits a child or elder adult to be, and then you 
have the language you're dropping out, which is the cat risk' language. Isn't that 
dropping out the exposure? 
Senator Julander: But look on 29 it's exposed to, to ingest or inhale. 
Senator Valentine: Obviously if you're dealing drugs to a kid, then that one is covered by 
three. 
Senator Julander: Excuse me? 
Senator Valentine: If you're dealing drugs to a child then that one is covered by 
paragraph three, and that's very obvious. I mean, and that should be an enhanced penalty. 
It's just the exposure of it being in the premises that I'm worried about. (Murmurs) See 
one of the problems is that if you have it just to the list of precursors on line 17 as you 
originally talked about, there are some things on those list of precursors that are in a lot of 
houses, probably your house. I could probably find some of those items; uh for example, 
uh some of those items in smaller quantities are in your medicine cabinet. But you need 
to be able to show exposure to those items, so that you cannot have a crime. I mean, that 
bothers me that you'd have a crime just because it's in the house. Let me give you one 
example, ephedrine, that in over the counter medications for decongestant, that's 
probably in medicine cabinet some place. Does that mean you committed a crime 
because you're grandchildren are in the same house as you are? That's wh, that's what's 
worrying me. 
Mr. President: Senator Julander? 
Senator Julander: I really think this is a policy question, and I would like to get more 
information, and get to you and circle the bill at the proper time. 
2 
Mr. President: Thank you I was going to suggest that you circle it for now, and then we'll 
get back to it. 
Senator Lander: I will get back with you; I would like to circle the bill. 
Senator Valentine: And senator thank you very much, I'm sorry these things are coming 
up pretty fast and I didn't get to talk to you in advance. 
Senator Lander: That's okay. That's okay; we'll clear it up. 
Senator Valentine: Thank you. 
Mr. President: The motion is to circle the bill, all in favor say aye. 
Senate: Aye 
Mr. President: Opposed? Motion passes. Senator Steel. 
Senator Steel: Thank you Mr. President. 
3 
Senate Debate on HB 125 March 4, 2002 
54th Leg. General Session, Day 43 Tape 49 
Mr. President: Senator Julander. I'm sorry I didn't give you a mic. 
Senator Julander: We discussed this bill on Friday, and Senator Valentine raised some 
questions and had some amendments, at this time I would yield to Senator Valentine. 
Mr. President: Yes, Senator Valentine I'm sorry, I'm day dreaming up here. 
Senator Valentine: There's someplace here that I had some amendments on this messy 
desk. They were passed out earlier, I. I'm not quite sure where they are, have we got 
those? Mr. President I move the amendments, and amendment number one under my 
name did it March 1st, 2002. Let me explain those amendments, I raised some issues last 
time about incidental contact with precursors with the, the elements and substances that 
are in precursors. And uh, after going back and talking with some of our prosecutors we 
found we did have a problem indeed, the problem is that, uh there has to be a sufficient 
amount intended to be used in the manufacturing of a controlled substance, and then the 
intent would then be presumed by the elements that were in the present bill. But that's 
what the amendment does, it uh, makes it so that the problems that I raised last time 
would not therefore be in the bill. That's my motion to amend. 
Mr. President: Questions on the motion to amend? All in favor of the amendment say 
aye. 
Senate: Aye 
Mr. President: Opposed? Motion passes; the bill as before us is amended. Senator Jewel 
Julander? 
Senator Julander: Thank you, uh I don't remember having any other questions, but at this 
time I would take any other question if there are any regarding this piece of legislation. 
Mr. President: .Any questions on this legislation? See none Senator. 
Senator Julander: I call for the vote that we, uh, under the suspension of the rules 
(inaudible). That we move to the third calendar. 
Mr. President: Motion is shall House Bill 123 be read for the third time, roll call vote. 
Roll call vote is done, (inaudible). 
Mr. President: Senator Bramble? 
4 
Senator Bramble: I apologize I've been having trouble getting my computer up, but I vote 
I on this. This is a bill that I spoke with the attorney that drafted it, and we resolved the 
issues I'd misunderstood that bill. So I do vote aye on it. 
: Hickman 
Mr. President: No there's nobody up there Senator Hickman. 
: Senator Hickman? 
Mr. President: That wasn't a voice from heaven, that's the roll call. 
Senator Hickman: Aye. 
Roll call finishes. 
Mr. President: I'm waiting for a voice from heaven like Senator Hickman, to give me an 
indication. Alright, House Bill 125, received 25 aye votes, no nay votes, four being 
absent passes to the third (inaudible) calendar. We'll now go to House Bill 206. 
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